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Abstract
This paper presents current research on Danish municipalities' use of ESCOs (Energy Service Companies) 
as a way to improve the standard of public buildings and to increase energy efficiency. ESCO has for many 
years been known as a way to realise energy efficiency in buildings. In Denmark, it has mainly been used in 
the industry so far, but in recent years more and more municipalities have taken up ESCO initiatives, in order 
to retrofit existing public buildings, and to make them more energy efficient. ESCO is in many ways a new 
way of collaboration for Danish municipalities, and therefore include many challenges. At the moment 15
municipalities (of 98 municipalities in Denmark) are involved in ESCO contracting. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the various experience gained so far by municipalities, and to discuss 
the drivers and barriers behind the development. We also discuss whether ESCO might lead to new ways of 
working with energy efficiency in public buildings, and possibly generate innovation in the public sector. 
There is already some evidence from the municipalities that on-going ESCO projects have led to new 
ambitious initiatives and plans for energy savings in municipalities
ESCOs have received much attention in different Danish energy-.efficiency policies, where ESCOs are often 
described as a promising way to achieve energy savings in existing housing and to overcome barriers 
encountered by other attempts at energy savings. Instead of assessing ESCO only on the amount of energy 
saved, we suggest that ESCO contracting could potentially become a learning process for municipalities, 
enabling and encourage public administrations to work in other ways with public-private and public-public 
partnerships on energy savings. Theoretically, it will compare the Danish development with international 
ESCO experience as well as refer to public innovation literature. Combined with empirical case studies on 
ESCO contracting, we discuss factors and conditions that influence decisions on ESCO, the flexibility of 
ESCO contracts and whether it implies an innovative process, or as a possible contrast, a 'once in a lifetime-
experience' for municipalities.
The paper is based on an on-going research project, which aims to identify the opportunities and barriers of
applying ESCO in the Danish housing market. The results are therefore preliminary. 
2Introduction
Background
In a recent survey on the European ESCO market, it has been noted that the situation in Denmark has 
changed over the last years, primarily due a growth in municipal ESCO projects (Marino et al., 2010). In 
2008 a handful of municipalities had started ESCO projects in municipal buildings, whereas in the beginning 
of 2011, 15 municipalities (of 98 municipalities in Denmark) have signed ESCO contracts or are preparing to 
do so. The experience gained by using ESCO are therefore still very new, and debates are still going on 
between municipalities on viewpoints and the pros and cons of ESCO contracting. Municipalities can be 
seen as locomotives for ESCO contracting in Denmark, and the municipalities’ experience with ESCO is 
likely to influence the rest of the ESCO market. Therefore, it is interesting to look at the experience with 
municipal ESCOs so far, and to understand the drivers and barriers for the development in the 
municipalities. 
As a general definition, an energy service company (ESCO) is a company that is engaged in developing, 
installing and financing comprehensive, performance-based projects (Vine, 2005). In an ESCO contract, the 
ESCO takes the risk for achieving defined energy savings, instead of the client (e.g. a building owner), 
making investments in energy savings measures more calculable and thereby attractive for clients. Practical 
definitions of ESCO however vary across Europe (Bertoldi et al., 2007). In the ESCO model used in Danish 
municipalities, the client takes the investment (i.e. no private or third-party financing), and the ESCO 
implements the agreed energy retrofitting initiatives, and guarantees a certain level of energy savings.
‘Energy Performance Contracting’ (EPC) would therefore be a more correct term to use, like in Sweden 
where similar types of contracts are used by the municipalities (Forsberg et al., 2007). As ‘ESCO’ however is 
used widely in a Danish context, the paper will also use this term. In the Danish context, ‘ESCO’ is used for 
the companies as well as for the types of agreements between the client and the provider. The agreements 
are generally and in this paper referred to as ‘ESCO contract, ESCO agreement’, ‘ESCO collaboration’ or as 
‘ESCO partnership’.
Purpose and methodology of the study
Our aim with the study is to identify drivers and barriers amongst the municipalities for using ESCO. This 
includes a question of whether the expectations that the municipality had to the ESCO have been met so far, 
and whether unexpected benefits, spin-off’s or organisational innovations appeared as a result of the 
process. We therefore also discuss whether ESCO contracting represents new ways of working with energy-
efficient retrofitting of buildings, for the municipalities. 
Another interesting question in relation to understanding the market diffusion of ESCO is the flexibility of the 
ESCO concept; does it allow different contexts (political, financial, organisational, technical), and how 
innovative are the municipalities in adapting ESCOs to the municipal context? For instance, ESCO 
contracting might inspire the municipal facilities management-function (FM) to create innovation and new 
roles for the FM section, for instance in order to disseminate their ESCO experience to private house owners 
in the municipality. In the understanding of the context and the possible learning taking place, we therefore 
also focus on the municipal FM function, its organisation and its collaboration with other departments. 
The paper is based on an on-going research project aiming to identify the potential and barriers to applying
ESCO contracting in the Danish housing market; the results are therefore preliminary. The paper t presents 
findings from the initial phases of the project including a survey of existing Danish ESCO initiatives, literature 
studies of ESCO experience as well as a case study on one of the first ESCO contracting projects in a 
Danish municipality. Parts of the study are based on recent Danish and international surveys and literature 
studies on ESCOs and ESCO contracting. Other parts are based on interviews with eight municipalities 
about their motivation and experience with ESCO contracting. They were carried out as semi-structured 
interviews with leading officers in the municipal administration, based on an interview guide. 
3The institutional framework for ESCO in Denmark
On a national level, ESCOs have been promoted and encouraged in different policy papers on energy 
savings in the existing building stock. It is seen as an essential input for reaching international as well as 
national goals on energy savings and CO2 reductions (including the European 20-20-20 goals); 40% of the 
energy consumed on a national level is used to heat buildings, and as several surveys have documented, 
there is a massive energy saving potential in energy retrofitting of the existing building stock, but it has also 
been difficult to implement energy saving measures in the existing building stock. 
As in other countries, the EU Directive on the Energy Performance of Buildings has been a driver for 
governments to encourage development of energy services (Bertoldi et al., 2007). As a first step, the Danish 
Government signed a political agreement in 2005 as part of the Directive, where the main objective was 
statutory energy labelling of both public and private buildings. To encourage energy savings, the 
municipalities were allowed to take loans for the renovation, if they included the suggestions for energy 
improvements outlined in the energy label for the buildings, as well as other specified energy reducing 
initiatives. Normally, municipalities are not allowed to start building projects by taking up loans, as a way for 
the state to keep municipal taxes under control. This also includes typical initiatives in an ESCO contract. 
Municipal loans typically have low interest rates and therefore third-party financing has not been interesting 
for the Danish municipalities in ESCO contracting. The guaranteed savings in the ESCO contract will cover 
the mortgages on the loan, and the municipality can therefore complete energy renovations as expense
neutral. This is the main ‘carrot’ for the municipalities to engage in ESCO projects, and thus energy labelling 
of municipal buildings plays an important role. To strengthen this, an agreement from 2007 between Local 
Government Denmark and the government settled that all initiatives for energy efficiency with low payback
time (< five years) outlined in the energy label on public buildings should be completed within four years. 
Experience shows that besides formal regulations, institutional capacity building can be an important tool for 
developing an ESCO market (Bertoldi et al., 2007), as for instance in Austria and Sweden. In Sweden, the 
formation of an Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) forum was formed in 2004 with the aim of creating 
contact between public building owners, consultants and ESCO companies, and communicating experience, 
as well as collecting and communicating experience gained from EPC contracting. Evaluations have later 
shown that the EPC forum has had a central role for the development of EPC in Sweden, by informing 
different actors about EPC and creating confidence in the concept (Forsberg et al., 2007). 
In Denmark, such institutional capacity building has not taken place as a coordinated effort, but different 
initiatives have contributed to it. Besides a general promotion as a tool for energy reductions in buildings, it 
has also been promoted by the Ministry of the Interior and Social Affairs as a way to increase public-private 
partnerships (PPP). This effort includes workshops with private and public partners to promote networks and 
to disseminate of knowledge, support to municipalities that consider ESCO contracting, action plans for 
public-private collaboration, collection of knowledge and 'best practice' etc. On another track, the ‘Centre for 
Energy Savings’, a publicly financed unit with the aim of promoting energy savings in general, has promoted 
ESCO, by disseminating knowledge of ESCO, monitoring development and experience in Danish 
municipalities, informed on ‘best practice’ etc. Finally, the ‘Energy Research Programme’ has initiated a 
number of R&D projects on ESCO, for instance on describing the elements in ESCO, experience from other 
countries, developing a standard contract on ESCO etc. Compared with the Swedish strategy, which had a 
much stronger international perspective, the Danish strategy has been less internationally oriented. The 
primary international flavour has been the compilation of international experience (primarily Sweden, Austria 
and US), and actors’ own experience from abroad (primarily Sweden). The formation of a Swedish forum on 
ESCO has apparently been given a more continuous platform for exchange of knowledge, whereas the 
Danish initiatives have been of a shorter duration (for instance workshops between ministries, municipalities, 
ESCO consultants, and ESCO suppliers). 
Moreover, as a contrast to the Swedish development, the climate agenda has been an important motivation 
for many municipalities, especially voluntary agreements. One is the ‘Climate Municipality’, a voluntary 
agreement between the municipality and the Danish Nature Saving Trust, which obliges the municipality to 
reduce energy consumption by 2% per year in the municipality as a whole, i.e. not just the municipal 
administration, but the municipality as a defined area, including private building owners. This includes not 
4just energy for heating of buildings but all kinds of energy, including supply, transport, electricity etc. At the 
moment, about 2/3 of all Danish municipalities have signed such an agreement. Another voluntary 
agreement is the ‘Curb-cutting agreement’ with the Centre for Energy Savings in which the municipality 
promises to reduce electricity consumption in public buildings by 2% per year. 
ESCO in Danish Municipalities: An overview
Table 1 lists the ten Danish municipalities that have signed an ESCO contract, including the main 
characteristics of the contract. In the following we briefly describe the development, the actors and the type 
of projects.
Table 1. Status for ESCO contracting in Danish municipalities as per 7 January 2011. Source: Danish Energy Savings Trust and interviews with 
municipalities. Besides these ten municipalities, another five municipalities are preparing ESCO contracts.
Municipality Volume in ESCO 
contract
ESCO 
supplier
Contract 
period
Investment,
€ / m2
Guarantee
d 
Savings
Improvements of:
Kalundborg 10 buildings 
30,000 m2
Schneider 
Electric
2009-2021 89 21% Technical system and installations
Middelfart 100 buildings
190,000 m2
Schneider 
Electric
2008-2015 31 20% Installations and indoor environment in all 
municipal buildings and re-insulation of a few 
buildings. Energy labelling of all buildings
København 27 buildings
68,000 m2
DONG 2009-2018 24 n.a. Energy savings and energy labelling of 
properties in the nursing facility “De Gamles 
By”
Gribskov 100 buildings
190,000 m2
Schneider 
Electric
2009-2016 18 17% Energy savings through better management 
and technical improvements of buildings
Vallensbæk 20 buildings
93,000 m2
Dansk Energi 
Management 
2009-2019 50 31% Technical systems and building envelope for 
the municipal buildings. Energy labelling
Kerteminde 48 buildings
117,000 m2
Schneider 
Electric
2009-2019 51 n.a. Technical systems and building envelope
Høje Taastrup 270 buildings
270,000 m2
Schneider 
Electric
2009-2021 20 18% Technical systems, indoor environment in all 
municipal buildings and better heat regulation
Halsnæs 120 buildings
175.884 m2
YIT 2009-2021 70 30% Installations and building envelope as well as 
incentives for users to savings
Greve 11 schools
100,000 m2
Siemens a/s 2009-2016 22 16-19% Better heat regulation, ventilation and lighting 
in schools and kinder gardens 
Sorø 65 buildings
133,000 m2
Schneider 
Electric
- 44 n.a. Energy systems and building envelope for all 
municipal buildings
Different stages
The municipalities are at different stages; some are in the initial phase of preparing a tender, whereas others 
have finished retrofitting and have entered the operational phase. The first Danish municipality to sign an 
ESCO contract was Kalundborg in 2006. Due to the municipal structure reform in 2007, the collaboration 
was delayed, but re-started in 2009. Meanwhile, two other municipalities, Gribskov and Middelfart, had 
started their ESCO projects. These three municipalities formed their own ‘ESCO network’, with close 
collaboration and knowledge-sharing in the initial phases, leading to several ideas on how the ESCO 
concept could be disseminated to other municipalities. In 2009 and 2010, several other municipalities (at the 
moment 15 municipalities) have signed ESCO contracts. The projects are typically divided into three stages: 
Energy audit (incl. energy labelling), implementation and operation. Typically, the contracts give the 
municipality the option to cancel the collaboration after each stage. This often gives the municipal decision-
makers more confidence to sign the contract, as a collaboration lasting 10-12 years may be difficult to 
predict, especially when municipalities rarely know the ESCO supplier beforehand.
Market actors
In contrast to many other European countries, where utilities have been the main providers of ESCO 
services (Bertoldi et al., 2007), the Danish market has been dominated by private companies that gained 
experiences from ESCO contracting in neighbouring countries, primarily Sweden. It should be noted that a 
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far), although several other ESCO suppliers have been present on the market for some time. Several 
consulting companies have developed competences on ESCO, and taken on the role of consultants for the 
municipalities on designing the tender and the contract on the ESCO collaboration. The utilities have not 
played a large role in developing ESCOs in the municipalities, but have instead focused more on developing 
ESCO-like concepts for private home owners (including the so-called ‘ESCO light’). 
Type of projects
There is a large variation in the number of buildings included in the ESCO contracts (from 10 to 270), with an 
average of 60 buildings (or 114.000 m2) per contract. Moreover the size of investments in the buildings 
varies, from 18 €/ m2 to 89 €/ m2, with an average of 37 € /m2. These figures are comparable with those of 
Sweden, where the average building volume for EPC contracts is 140,000 m2, and investments typically are 
around 35 €/m2 (Wormslev, 2008). In all cases the contracts are based on the guarantee model; the 
municipalities finance the retrofitting, and the ESCO guarantees a certain energy reduction, based on the 
retrofitting initiatives defined in the contract. If the reduction is not reached, the ESCO will pay the 
municipality the difference. If more than the guaranteed savings are reached, the municipality and the ESCO 
will share the surplus according to conditions defined in the contract. The guaranteed savings are typically • 
20% of the existing energy consumption. Improvements on regulation and control (for instance introducing 
CTS, and equipment for steering and monitoring) that allow energy use that often have a short payback
period (small costs and high energy savings), whereas improvements that include the physical improvements 
of the building (e.g. new windows, insulation or other improvements of the building envelope) have longer 
payback periods and therefore are often kept out of the contracts. It is, however, possible to define a 
combination of regulation improvements and building improvements, which some municipalities have already 
done. These differences are partly reflected in the various guarantees for energy savings in the contracts, 
ranging from 16-17% to 30-31% reduction of the energy budget in the municipal buildings, with an average 
of 22%.
Drivers and barriers for using ESCO
Compared with the high expectations to the ESCO concept as a tool for providing more energy-efficient 
retrofitting of public buildings, the limited number of municipalities using ESCO is often described as 
‘disappointing’ and ‘a failure for the government’. In contrast, others describe the ESCO market as ‘coming 
and ‘evolving’, as many municipalities are interested in the concept, and the number of municipalities signing 
ESCO contracts is increasing. This illustrates different viewpoints on the development, and that there are 
ongoing discussions amongst Danish municipalities about the possible benefits of using ESCO projects. In 
the following, we take up some of the potential drivers and barriers discussed in the current debate on 
ESCO, as well as drivers and barriers taken from the international literature on ESCO, and discuss this in 
relation to observations made from interviews and studies on municipalities engaged in ESCO contracting.
Energy labelling
As mentioned in the Introduction, energy labelling of municipal buildings is a cornerstone for promoting
ESCO contracting. However, many municipalities have not completed the energy labelling of their buildings 
yet. A survey from December 2009 showed that at that time only 30% of municipalities had completed the 
energy labelling (KL, 2010). Therefore a central motivation for completing the retrofitting of the buildings has
been missing; the municipalities have less overview of the buildings, their energy consumption and their
savings potential, and also have no access to take up loans for financing the retrofitting. A survey on ESCOs 
in Danish municipalities showed that many municipalities find it hard to find financing for energy savings in 
buildings (IDA, November 2010), which could be related to the lack of energy labelling. On the other hand, 
data from the municipalities show that energy labelling of the municipal building portfolio is included in many 
ESCO contracts. Thus, the demand for energy labelling of municipal buildings might actually work as a driver 
for ESCOs, although not in the intended way. The outcome of the energy labelling can also be argued; the 
labelling system has been heavily criticised for not delivering value for money and some municipalities share 
this viewpoint. “We started labelling our buildings four years ago, and what did we get for the money? We
learned that we did not reduce the energy just by labelling the buildings” (officer, municipality of Høje 
Taastrup). Nevertheless, this led to considerations on other ways to save energy, and this is where they 
started to take an interest in ESCO. Other municipalities have similar stories; energy labelling is a mandatory 
6first step to learn about energy savings in municipal buildings, and in this exercise ESCO contracting seems 
to be a possibility.  
Financing 
A main reason for the municipality to enter an ESCO contract is the possibility of financing the improvements 
of many buildings over a short time. If the municipality should finance the renovations traditionally, there 
would only be room for gradual improvements, due to municipal budget limitations. In an ESCO project the 
municipality is allowed to take out loans for the entire project at the same time, as the ESCO supplier 
guarantees the savings. For instance, one municipality states that it could have had 1 million Dkr. per year 
(130,000 €) over the coming years, but the ESCO contract gives them 68 million Dkr.(9 million €). For some 
municipalities it might be the only reason, as they see themselves as capable of completing the building 
improvements themselves. “Naturally, if we had had the 70 million. Dkr. ourselves, we would have done it, 
because we would have had the savings in cash afterwards” (officer, municipality of Høje Taastrup). 
The counter argument to the attractive financing options is that ‘ESCO is too expensive’. A survey from 2010 
showed that the main reason for municipalities not to enter ESCO contracting is a better economy by doing it 
yourself, i.e. that the ESCO arrangement is too expensive; 82% of the municipal directors claims that in 
terms of economy it is better to finance the improvements in other ways than as an ESCO contract.
Nevertheless, such financing is difficult to find, and it is an open question what the alternative to ESCO 
financing there is. One possibility, as indicated in the quote above, is municipal equity, another is funding it 
out of the ordinary budget, but this would be possible only for major municipalities.
The question of ESCO’s being expensive is not a question raised by municipalities that have already signed 
a contract. The municipalities accept that the ESCO suppliers earn money on the contract, but the main 
argument is that the ESCO allows an instant improvement to take place. Another aspect concerns the 
administrative capacity to carry out the building improvements. This is usually not mentioned in the 
discussion of the pros and cons on ESCO, but it is very important for especially the smaller municipalities 
that do not have the staff to complete such a large task. As one municipality explains: “It would take a long 
time to establish an organisation that could manage an assignment like that, and we would have to start to 
downsize it almost as soon as we had started” (officer, municipality of Vallensbæk). In a similar way, other 
municipalities state, that it would have been completely impossible to carry out such a task with their staff, 
which is usually very small. Keeping this task in-house therefore, for many municipalities, require a major re-
organisation, which would in many cases be unrealistic.
Political commitment
Surveys on municipal engagement in ESCO have indicated that municipalities that have signed up as 
‘Climate Municipality’ are more interested in ESCO and have a more positive attitude towards it than other 
municipalities. Our interviews indicate that the ‘Climate Municipality’ as well as the ‘Curb-cutter’ deal present  
great challenges for the municipalities, but also a political acceptance to pursue energy savings. Reducing 
energy consumption by 2% p.a. is a challenge that requires extraordinary initiatives: “We could save 2% a
couple of years, using our own municipal finance. But after that it would become difficult. 2% per year is 
actually very ambitious…but then one of our consultants mentioned ESCO as an opportunity” (officer, 
municipality of Halsnæs). On the other hand, there are also examples of using ESCO in municipalities that 
are not politically very engaged in the climate agenda. Here, ESCO is seen as a way of being able to do 
something on energy retrofitting, without having to engage very much in it. “If you had politicians that were 
really engaged, then you were already rolling, and you just needed to go on, instead of starting from scratch. 
But in our case it is better with an ESCO project, then you can see what you get for your money” (officer, 
municipality of Kerteminde). 
Energy-saving potential of buildings
In some municipalities the potential for energy savings is too small for an ESCO due to well-maintained 
buildings. In general, however, Danish public buildings have a large back-log on maintenance, and a survey
found that 25% of public managers assess the energy standard of municipal buildings as ‘low’ or ‘very low’ 
(IDA, 2010), which suggests a large potential for the retrofitting of the municipal buildings. The contracts from 
the present ESCO municipalities show that there is room for flexibility in defining how poor standard of the 
buildings has to be to be included in the ESCO contract. In one municipality, the preparations for ESCO 
contracting showed that the buildings were in better shape than expected, which made it difficult to find the 
15% energy reductions that were the aim. Therefore, the municipality had to ‘climb up the tree for the high-
7hanging fruits’, for instance by including solar panels on the town hall in the contract. The city council had to 
accept that the payback period was raised from 15 to 20 years, which according to the officer was a great
challenge. 
If only the buildings with the greatest potential are included, and only simple improvements are made, it is 
possible to reduce the payback time and reduce investments. If, however, more buildings are included and 
ambitions are raised regarding building improvements, payback time will rise, and so will the investments. 
The benefit is that more buildings are included, and the total amount of energy savings will increase. 
Therefore many municipal officers argue that once the politicians have accepted the ESCO strategy, as 
many buildings as possible should be included in the contract. This will allow not only energy reductions to
be reached, but it would potentially improve the indoor climate and reduce the maintenance backlog. 
Therefore many municipalities try to get as many buildings as possible included, so that the initiatives with 
short payback time will ‘finance’ initiatives with long payback times. This is a difficult balance that the 
municipalities have to find, as expressed by this officer in Sorø: “…it takes many improvements with short 
payback periods to enable inclusion of windows, walls, doors and all the other things with a long payback
period.” (officer, municipality of Sorø).
It is not an easy task to decide how the tender should be structured, and the concept might be changed 
along the way, as the officers learn about the possibilities and get input from discussions with other 
stakeholders in the municipality. As an example, one municipality started out with a conservative aim of 15% 
savings that they were certain that they could find. However other stakeholders raised the question, why the 
goals were not more ambitious, if some ESCO supplier said they could save for instance 30%. This led to a 
new project description, with more ambitious goals, including that 15% of the reductions should come from 
renewable energy, and 35% from improvements of the building envelope. This illustrates that in the course of
the process of defining the project, there is room for flexibility and for being innovative with regard to the 
types of buildings included. Defining the potential is therefore not a simple question, but depends of the 
strategy and the political commitment in the municipality. 
Keeping competences in-house 
One of the main reasons for the reluctant attitude amongst some municipalities, as also mentioned by 
Bertoldi et al., (2007), is the alternatives to ESCO regarding energy retrofitting. One of the main arguments 
against ESCO is that it is more profitable for the municipality to complete the energy-efficient retrofitting 
themselves, as an in-house project (IDA, 2010; NRGi, 2009) and that they are sceptical about the financing 
mechanisms in the ESCO arrangement. Many also argue that if the municipality itself completes the energy-
retrofitting, competences will stay in-house. “The companies offering ESCO-contracts with the municipalities 
want to get a hold on the long end, and we are not interested in that” (quote from a leader of the building 
section in a municipality who has rejected an ESCO collaboration). As an alternative, the municipality might 
finance a systematic retrofitting with its own resources, they might start a strategy with private companies on 
reducing energy demand in the municipal buildings, or other types of arrangements. The argument for 
keeping competences in-house might also reflect more ideological views on public-private partnerships. 
However, in practice the option for an in-house strategy is limited to the larger municipalities with bigger
staffs, more competences and better economic resources. As our interviews also show, for smaller 
municipalities this is practically impossible. 
Lack of knowledge 
An often mentioned barrier in a European context is lack of information and understanding about ESCO 
(Bertoldi et al., 2007). These are, however, rarely mentioned as a barrier in the Danish debate. Different 
surveys have demonstrated that very few municipalities mention lack of knowledge of ESCO as a reason for 
not using ESCO (IDA, 2010; NRGi, 2010). There has been no evaluation of the Danish efforts to promote 
ESCO on a national level and whether this has motivated the municipalities. In our interviews with the 
municipalities, no one mentioned the national supportive initiatives, but all referred to other reasons and 
stories for being involved. This includes information and knowledge about ESCO from different informal 
sources, for instance talking with other municipalities, meetings with ESCO suppliers, from the media and 
others sources. Some Danish municipalities have also visited Swedish and German municipalities to learn 
from their experience. At the time when the Danish market emerged in 2007, about 20 Swedish 
municipalities had already signed an ESCO contract. Many ESCO providers (Schneider electric, Siemens, 
YIT etc.) have built their competences and gained experience on the Swedish market, and applied it on the 
8Danish market. This has given Danish clients (municipalities) more confidence in using the ESCO model, as 
the providers could refer to cases from similar municipalities in Sweden. 
Transaction costs 
Transaction costs is another well-known barrier tor ESCO (Bertoldi et al., 2007) and PPP in general. If 
transaction costs rise, e.g. related to due diligence or to contract formulation, the volume of the contract also 
needs to be proportionally higher to maintain the net benefit. The minimum volume for an ESCO project in 
the Danish context is assessed to 10-15 million Dkr. (1.5-2 million €) (IDA, 2010). This has rarely been 
discussed as a problem in the Danish ESCO debate. One reason for this might be that the municipal reform 
in 2007 reduced the number of municipalities in Denmark from 279 to 98, increasing the average size of a 
municipality to approx. 50,000 inhabitants, and also increasing the municipal building stock. This makes it 
easier for the municipalities to send a large volume of buildings to tender, thereby reducing the transaction 
costs. The average ESCO project is approx. 5.5 million € in volume, and therefore well beyond the critical 
limit of 2 million €. Other types of transaction costs involve the legal aspects of the tender and the contract. 
In a survey, 10% of the technical directors mention the legal challenges of ESCO as a barrier to using 
ESCO, and 8% mention the process of tender as a reason for not using ESCO. As an example, one 
municipality in a survey states that “the legal aspects about the guarantee for energy savings are often 
complicated and require vast amounts of documentation in order to work” (IDA, 2010).On a regulatory level, 
the initiatives to reduce transaction costs have been limited. A standard contract for municipal ESCO’s has 
been developed (Elsparefonden, 2009), but we have no reports on municipalities actually using it. The 
question of transaction costs was not brought up by any of our informants during the interviews, but the legal 
challenges were mentioned by many. This especially concerns the tender, where most municipalities use 
consultants. Especially the limitations of EU tenders that do not allow up-scaling of a project without a new 
tender were mentioned by several municipalities as an important issue to be aware of. 
Analytical perspectives: ESCO and Innovation
As indicated in the sections above, ESCO contracting implies many challenges for the municipalities, which 
might lead to new ways of working with energy savings in buildings, with end-users, with public-private 
partnerships or different ways of organising the municipal administration. 
A theoretical model of innovation
In order briefly to get an understanding of 
innovation as a phenomenon, some definitions 
are appropriate. Van de Ven (1999) defines
innovation in general as “new ideas that are 
developed and implemented to achieve desired
outcomes by people who engage in transactions
(relationships) with others in changing institutional 
and organizational contexts." (Van de Ven 
1999:6). Jean Hartley (2005) defines innovation in 
the public sector as follows: “Those changes 
worth recognizing as innovation should be…new 
to the organization, be large enough, general 
enough and durable enough to appreciably affect 
the operations or character of the organization 
(Moore et al., 1997, p. 276, quoted from Hartley 
2005). And finally, Albury defines innovation in 
the public sector as follows: “Successful 
innovation is the creation and implementation of 
new processes, products, services and methods 
of delivery which result in significant 
improvements in outcomes, efficiency, effectiveness or quality (Albury 2005: 51).” What the definitions have 
in common is that innovation is the creation of new ideas that are developed and implemented in the form of 
new processes, products, services and methods of delivery, in order to achieve desired outcomes, which, in 
case of success (!), will result in significant improvements in outcomes, efficiency, effectiveness or quality.
Figure 1. Key components in the innovation journey. Source: Van de 
Ven, 1999. 
9However, each of the above authors stresses some central aspects worth mentioning regarding innovation in 
the public sector. First of all, Van de Ven emphasises the process aspect of innovation, which to a very high 
degree is characterised by confusion, constant change, and uncertainty: “The journey is an exploration into 
the unknown process by which novelty emerges. The process is characterized as inherently uncertain and 
dynamic, and it seemingly follows a random process” (1999:3). As an illustration of this seemingly random 
dynamic in innovation enterprises, Van de Ven uses Figure 1. Figure 1 shows us ‘the innovation journey’ 
from the left to the right. Of importance is the constantly changing environment of the innovation (Figure 1, 
Nos. 7-10), whereas the development and implementation process is characterised by numerous setbacks 
but also a proliferation of spin-off opportunities (Figure 1, Nos. 3-12). What the research (mainly from the 
private sector) demonstrates is that innovation is to a large extent a matter of taking risks; and that the 
plausibility that the innovation project might fail, is an acknowledged condition in the private sector. So, it 
seems plausible to suggest that what drives the innovation forward according to Van de Ven is the 
uncertainty and challenges in the innovation process, which forces the participants to be creative in problem 
solving – but also forces the participants to think in new development and spin-off opportunities, based on 
the learning generated in the process.
Hartley (2005) stresses the fact that innovation in a public sector context should to some extent be radical in 
order to distinguish innovation from the usual organisational improvements (see Figure 2). But she also 
stresses that innovation enterprises in the public sector is often more constrained than in the private sector, 
in that it also has to yield visible improvements (square 4 in Figure 2).  Hartley suggests that the main driver 
for innovation these days is the dynamic of networked governance. Compared with hierarchy and new public 
management, network governance steers through 
networks (Hartley 2005:30). Though Hartley does
not define networked governance, she states that 
network governance revitalises the leadership roles 
in the public sector, and forces managers and their 
frontline staff to take on the role of the ‘explorers’ 
(ibid.: 29). Summarising the growing literature on 
network governance, Sørensen & Torfing (2005: 
15) define network governance as ’a relatively 
stable horizontal interfacing of interdependent, but 
operationally autonomous actors, 2) that interacts 
and tries to influence each other through 
negotiations, 3) that takes place in an 
institutionalised community, 4) that is self-regulating 
within a framework defined by the political 
authorities and 5) in a broad sense contributes to 
public regulation’. 
In other words: network governance forces the public sector to facilitate networks of otherwise un-coupled 
actors and to design the network as a set-up where these actors can pursue their own interest, and at the 
same time contribute to the political goal achievement of the public agency. This is both a substantial, 
organisational and strategic challenge.   
Analysis: ESCO innovation in local government? 
Innovation theory helps us identify an innovation phenomenon, that is, which dynamics to expect in the 
innovation process, and what role to play as a local government actor in order to create opportunities for 
innovation to occur. But it cannot tell us anything about what the desired outcomes are for local 
governments, how to measure their degree of success on an innovation scale, and what the potential 
barriers are. Therefore, we need to adapt innovation to an ESCO context in order to establish an innovation
scale for ESCOs in Denmark. The experience gained in Denmark hitherto shows us that it is possible to use 
ESCO as an innovation platform that creates both improvement and innovation (Hartley 2005), but that this 
is definitely not the standard option for most local governments. We will discuss possible innovative changes 
in the municipalities’ practice and understanding, having applied the ESCO model. However, as Danish 
municipalities have just recently begun their ESCO collaboration, which typically lasts for a period of 12-15 
years, the experience is so far limited. Nevertheless, there is already some evidence from the municipalities 
Figure 2. Innovations and improvements. Source: Hartley, 2005. 
10
that ongoing ESCO projects have led to new ambitious initiatives and plans for energy saving in the 
municipality.
When analysing the practices of Danish local governments from an innovation perspective, it is possible to 
place them on a tentative innovation scale:   
Step 1: improvements achieved, but no innovation 
Step 2: Improvements achieved as well as small-scale spin-offs, but no innovation 
Step 3: Improvements achieved as well as innovation, but no successful innovation 
By ‘improvements’ we mean what the standard desired outcomes are for local governments using ESCO: 
Reductions in energy consumption, energy labelling of municipal buildings, competences transferred to the 
end-users – but also regular building renovation. By ‘innovation’ we mean a challenging, confusing and 
perhaps spin-off rewarding adaptation process, where local government take on the roles of explorer and 
network facilitator, which may lead to achieved outcomes and improvements otherwise not possible.
 
Step 1: improvements ‘yes’, innovation ‘no’
What characterises this group of municipalities at this stage is a routinised project approach to the ESCO 
enterprise, following this line of reasoning: “ESCO is just one project out of many others, the process has 
been relatively predictable, nothing unexpected has happened so far, we manage the process by hiring 
advisors, which more or less guarantees that the ESCO project delivers as planned.” As a civil servant stated 
when asked about surprises in the ESCO project: “No, nothing really unexpected occurred, everything has 
been working very smoothly (…) We are a very small municipality with only 16,000 citizens, and we have a 
high degree of outsourcing” (officer, municipality of Vallensbæk). This illustrates that for some municipalities, 
ESCO can appear as another outsourcing service on offer, which is similar to existing municipal practices. 
In an innovation perspective, we can argue that municipalities approaching ESCO in this way get what they 
want, but nothing more. That is, they do not get new development opportunities, and ESCO as a concept 
does not lead to any reflections on reconsidering ‘business-as-usual’. The reason for this might be that all 
the disturbing and challenging elements (Van de Ven, 1999) have been ‘outsourced’ to the ESCO and legal 
advisors. In this way, no capacity building or learning are created within the local government organisation. 
One barrier for organisational innovation and learning thus turns out to be the outsourcing of challenges to 
advisors and ESCO, a conclusion that corresponds well with the experience of municipalities that do the 
energy-retrofitting themselves: they want to keep the project and the capacity-building process ‘in-house’. In 
fact, it seems that one municipality has had this experience: “We've handed it over to the ESCO, and the 
ESCO has made a project description. But we have not had the knowledge of the details, I would have liked
a little more insight in what they actually did with our buildings. If we were to do it again, we would need to 
have better insight into what actually needs to be done” (officer, municipality of Kerteminde). Another barrier 
to innovation mentioned by one of these municipalities was that they did not have the resources for 
developing the ESCO as a project any further. Typically, municipal officers are busy taking care of the ESCO 
and their FM assignments, and have no time or resources for developing innovative concepts. This finding 
corresponds with Mulgan & Albury (2003), stating that one of the main drivers for innovation in the public 
sector is access to funding for experiments.     
Step 2: Improvements achieved as well as small-scale spin-offs, but no innovation 
Municipalities are placed on this step mainly due to their creative and pro-active ways of using ESCO. As an 
example, the municipality of Halsnæs had been on a study trip to Sweden thereby learning about the 
importance of communication aspects in user involvement, and about the best way to involve users as well 
as their wishes for renovation. The Halsnæs municipality is also considering motivating technical staff and 
users to be ambitious about their ‘energy-saving’ education by collaborating with a local business school, 
thereby giving them a certificate. Finally, as a part of the contract with ESCO, Halsnæs has demanded that a 
fixed percentage of future energy consumption should be covered by green energy, thus resulting in the 
construction of a solar cell plant. This creativity led to a new development opportunity that could be used to 
fuel the cars of the nursery staff in the municipality Another municipality (Høje Taastrup) has been creative in 
using ESCO as a means to reach several political ends. The municipality of Høje Taastrup is first of all one 
of the Danish ‘Climate Municipalities’, and ESCO could be seen as one of the first steps to reach the climate 
goals in 2020. Second, another political aim was to create a better indoor climate in all public buildings, and 
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ESCO is doing just that. Finally, because of budget constraints, only self-financing projects are to be 
launched in Høje Taastrup, and ESCO also satisfies this demand. An unplanned spin-off opportunity was 
that due to ESCO the municipality could afford to upgrade a significant part of their buildings to zero-
emission buildings, which would otherwise have had to be postponed. This was possible because of a 
competent and resourceful staff that as part of ESCO gained an unprecedented knowledge of their building. 
In conclusion, one might see municipalities on this step as having a more creative ‘in-house’ grip on the 
ESCO project, which has made it possible to connect the ESCO project with other strategies. However, none 
of the referred municipalities have to this date any ambitions of extending the ESCO concept, for instance to 
include other types of buildings or facilities, or even use the experience to involve private building owners in 
ESCO arrangements. The reason for this  might be that these municipalities are in a time-consuming 
implementation phase. But also that it is quite resource-demanding to involve homeowners and private 
parties in such activities. 
Step 3: Improvement and innovation – but with some challenges
An example on an innovative approach to ESCO is the municipality of Middelfart, where the successful 
ESCO-retrofitting of the municipality’s building stock has led to a dissemination of the ESCO concept to other 
areas of the municipal administration. The municipality has tried to ‘copy’ the functions of an ESCO to also 
encompass private homeowners’ buildings by establishing a network with local and regional actors (energy
suppliers, carpenters, plumbers, financing institutions and others) that could offer the homeowners an 
‘energy-saving package’ consisting of a free energy audit of the house (inspired by the energy label) and an 
offer to implement the initiatives with low payback time. In contrast to a ‘real’ ESCO, this did not include 
guaranteed of energy savings. The idea was to make homeowners in different neighbourhoods give a 
collective tender on energy renovations of buildings that are technically similar. In doing this, the municipality 
took on the role of the explorative leader, a strategy of network governance (Hartley 2005). The advantage of 
a possible success would have been a heavy reduction of CO2 emission as well as employment for local 
business. However, pooling home owners in a rural environment proved more difficult than expected; the 
network governance may have a reduced effect in rural settings compared with urban areas, maybe because 
the ‘sampling‘ density of similar buildings varies. Therefore, different concepts for engaging the local 
homeowners has subsequently been developed and tested. Nevertheless, this initiative and the municipal 
ESCO are embedded in a vision for the municipality, where the strategy is to build competences amongst 
the local enterprises for energy renovation, and doing this in networks with other municipal actors. Also, 
initiatives are being taken to encourage other building owners (for instance social housing associations) to 
implement energy savings, inspired by the municipal ESCO project.
In conclusion, the municipality of Middelfart has so far been the most innovative municipality, primarily 
because the municipality learned important lessons from the ESCO, which it afterwards tried to copy by 
applying a network governance strategy. It is important to note that Middelfart has taken some of the first 
important steps to think creatively about using ESCO to reduce CO2 emission in the entire building stock of 
the municipality, and that one of the drivers in this innovation process was the access to external funding, 
which provided Middelfart with the resources necessary for experimenting. 
Conclusions
Our preliminary studies of the ESCO development in Denmark suggest that ESCO as a concept holds great
potential for flexible interpretations, i.e. that it can be formulated and argued in many different ways to fit the 
local context. What seems as a more or less uniform concept is revealed by a closer look to have many 
different drivers and logics for the municipalities. This includes issues on financing, on political commitment 
to pursue energy reductions, on defining the ESCO tender and composing different types of initiatives in 
buildings, issues on competences and the internal municipal organisation, and the traditions of carrying out 
public-private collaboration. The flexibility of ESCO might to a large degree decide to which extent the 
concept will be applied more generally in Danish municipalities.
We observed that the national initiatives for institutional capacity building on ESCO seem to have had limited 
influence on the municipalities’ knowledge of and decisions on ESCO, and have been relatively weak 
compared with those of other countries. They might however have had an effect on the supply-side amongst 
ESCO suppliers and consultants, but this has not been studied. The limited institutional capacity building 
12
might have had an influence on the development, but we also observed that the municipalities have collected 
information on ESCO from other informal sources that have helped them in their decision to take up ESCO
contracting. To a large extent, the development in Denmark has benefited from the development in other 
countries, primarily Sweden, on the supply-side (ESCO suppliers having gained experience from projects in 
Swedish municipalities), as well as the demand-side (Danish municipalities learning from Swedish 
municipalities). Compared with the Swedish development, the local commitment to reaching agreed energy
savings has been a strong motivation for the Danish ESCOs, along with the mandatory energy labelling 
being linked to the opportunity for loan-taking for energy renovations.
An interesting issue is raised on completing energy renovations as ESCO projects versus as an in-house 
project, thus keeping competences within the municipality. Smaller municipalities have limited options for the 
latter solution, but for large municipalities this might raise a dilemma that defines the future role of the 
municipal administration; to what extent should municipal competences concern hands-on knowledge on 
building management, including energy reductions, and to what extent should the competences concern 
management of out-sourcing, public-private partnerships, networked governance etc.?
Our analysis also suggests that ESCO contracting implies potential for public innovations, as learning taking 
place in the process can be exploited in different arenas, giving the municipality new roles, for instance as 
performing network-based governance in relation to local actors outside the municipal administration. We 
therefore see ESCO not only as an option to pursue goals on energy reductions and maintenance back-log, 
but also as a way to develop municipal administration in more innovative directions. 
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